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SOMBER REFLECTIONS ON THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
The Military and ParamilitaryActivities case' deepens the gloom already
surrounding the two forms of the International Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Neither Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which confers general compulsory jurisdiction upon the Court in cases of reciprocal state declarations,2
nor that part of Article 36(1) which vestsjurisdiction when treaties so provide
has been particularly successful in recent practice. No one denies that the
ICJ has served a useful, if occasional, role when it has heard and decided
cases voluntarily submitted by then-willing states pursuant to the specially
conferred provision of Article 36(1). What is in question is the utility of the
all too many recent cases where the Court has taken jurisdiction pursuant
to the compulsory provisions of its Statute and then has been, to one degree
or another, disregarded.
Since 1966, when the ICJ did a volte-face and declined to decide the South
West Africa case,3 a moment Professor Leo Gross thought the "nadir" of the
Court's fortunes,4 the ICJ has been considerably more courageous. However,
its courage, at least in compulsory jurisdiction cases, has been shown in the
face of considerable opposition by states. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction cases have been beset with nonappearing defendants:
Iceland in the FisheriesJurisdictioncases, 5 France in the Nuclear Tests Cases,6
Turkey in the Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf case,7 Iran in the Diplomaticand
ConsularStaff case,8 and now the United States in the merits phase of the
Military and ParamilitaryActivities case.9
Albeit Article 94(1) of the Charter of the United Nations obliges every
state "to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party,'"a in practice since 1945 states haled into the
ICJ by way of compulsory jurisdiction too often have failed to obey adverse
court rulings. Albania refused to pay reparations to Great Britain in Corfu
Channel,1 Iran disregarded the Court's order to refrain from nationalizing
' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986

ICJ REP. 14 (Judgment ofJune 27).
2 Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945), TS No. 993, Art. 36.
'South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.) (Second Phase), 1966 ICJ REP.
6 (Judgment ofJuly 18).
4

Gross, Conclusions, in 2 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUS'TICE 727,747

(L. Gross ed. 1976).
sFisheries Jurisdiction (UK v Ice.; FRG v. Ice.), Interim Protection, 1972 ICI REP. 12, 30

(Orders of Aug. 17); Jurisdiction of the Court, 1973 ICJ REP. 3, 49 (Judgments of Feb. 2);
Merits, 1974 ICJ REP. 3, 175 (Judgments of July 24).
6 Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.; NZ v. Fr.), 1974 ICJ REP. 253, 457 (Judgments of Dec. 20).
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 ICJ REP. 3 (Judgment of Dec. 19).
8 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 ICJ REP. 7
(Order of Dec. 15); 1980 ICJ REP. 3 (Judgment of May 24).
9 1986 ICJ REP. 14.
UN CHARTER, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945), TS No. 993, art. 94(1).
uCorfu Channel (UK v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 ICJ REP. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
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a British corporation pending a final judgment of the Court or agreement
between the parties in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., 2 Iceland refused to obey an
order not to enforce a 50-mile fishing zone until the Court ruled on suits
brought by West Germany and the United Kingdom in FisheriesJurisdiction,'3
Iran rejected the Court's Order and Judgment that it release the American
hostages in Diplomatic and ConsularStaff,1 4 and the United States has now
declared that it will ignore the Court's ruling in Military and Paramilitary
Activities."5 There is always the theoretical possibility of enforcing an ICJ
judgment against a recalcitrant state by having the Security Council take
action,'" but in practice this has not occurred. 7 What gain is there in disregarded compulsory jurisdiction cases?
Almost three decades ago, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht concluded that the
Court was much more useful as a vehicle for developing the rules of inter8
national law than it was as a means of maintaining international peace.'
Certainly, there is grist for many legal mills in the language of even ineffective
compulsory jurisdiction cases, Military and ParamilitaryActivities being no
exception. The majority opinion alone has new and very illuminating language about, inter alia, nonappearing parties,' 9 the proof of facts in international law,2" the relationship of treaty law and customary international
law, 2 ' and aggression and self-defense.22
There may also be some public relations value in otherwise ineffective
compulsory jurisdiction cases. The United States, for example, sought to
use the Diplomaticand ConsularStaffcase as a means of maintaining "support
for the American position by the vast majority of nations on earth, 23 although it is doubtful the ICJ was ultimately so useful in freeing the hostages
as were the economic sanctions taken against Iran.2 4 In the Military and
ParamilitaryActivities case, it is far too early to tell whether Nicaragua will
2

Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK v. Iran), Interim Protection, 1951 ICJ REP.89 (Order of July 5).
13 1972 ICJ REP. 12, 30.
111979 ICJ REP. 7; 1980 ICJ REP. 3.
'5 1986 ICJ REP. 14; see The Times (London), June 28, 1986, at 1.
16UN CHARTER, supra note 10, art. 94(2), which reads in full:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under ajudgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken
to give effect to the judgment.
" In Diplomatic and ConsularStaff, before the Judgment came down, the Soviet Union had
already vetoed a U.S. proposal to the Security Council to impose an economic boycott against
Iran. There were 10 votes in favor, 2 against, 2 abstentions and 1 not voting. UN Doc.
S/PV.2191/Add.1, at 54-55 (1980). The United States never asked the Security Council to
enforce the Court's Judgment. In the Military and Paramilitarycase, the United States vetoed
Security Council action.
18 H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT 4-5 (1958).
2
' 1986 ICJ REP. at 23-26, paras. 26-31.
oId. at 38-45, paras. 57-74.
21 Id. at 92-97, paras. 172-82.
Ild. at 97-117, paras. 183-225.
2 President Carter, Address of Jan. 8, 1980, DEP'T ST. BULL., March 1980, No. 2036, at
33.
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See Janis, The Role of the InternationalCourt in the Hostages Crisis, 13 CONN. L. REv. 263

(1981).
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be any more successful in its attempt to use the Court's Judgment to sway
public opinion in the United States and in other states.25
Against such gains must be weighed the loss in respect for the ICJ when
it acts like a court in name but not in deed. These cases of compulsory
jurisdiction display the Court in its weakest and least effectual role. In these
circumstances, the ICJ does not truly adjudicate disputes, if "adjudication"
has anything to do with a decision that actually settles a matter.
Plainly, much of the blame for the loss in respect for the Court rests on
the shoulders of noncomplying defendant states that are failing to observe
Article 94(1) of the Charter. Some fault, too, lies with applicant states that
use the Court as a public forum when they know that the ICJ has little
practical chance of effectively resolving a dispute. Realistically, it may be
time for us to recognize that, given the present context of world politics,
the compulsory jurisdiction provisions of the ICJ Statute are simply overoptimistic and that the surer and better role for the Court is in the adjudication of cases jointly submitted by willing states. It may be time, too, for
the ICJ to contemplate a strategic retreat and in cases of compulsory jurisdiction to be willing to contemplate a doctrine ofjudicial restraint when it
seems unlikely that its decisions will be respected in practice.
MARK WESTON JANIS*

CUSTOM ON A SLIDING SCALE
Every student who has ever taken a traditional international law course
has learned Manley Hudson's four elements for the emergence of a rule of
customary international law:
(a) concordant practice by a number of States with reference to a
type of situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable
period of time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with,
prevailing international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States.'
In the give-and-take of international relations, and in the jurisprudence
of the International Court, these elements have been compressed into two:
consistent state practice and Hudson's third element, the opin juris.2 In
25 For some of the public relations efforts of Nicaragua with respect to the Court'sJudgment,
see The Times (London), July 28, 1986, at 5; and id., July 30, 1986, at 5.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
'[1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
See especially North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP.
3, 41-44 (Judgment of Feb. 20).

